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Process and Rules in
International
Environmental Law
Ilias Plakokefalos*

Review Essay: Daniel Bodansky, The Art and Craft of
International Environmental Law

I. An Overview
The book under review is not a classic textbook. It does not, in other words, try to offer a
comprehensive, thematic overview of the issues that arise in the context of international
environmental law.1 It is rather an effort to present the way environmental law evolves — or
ought to evolve. This is evident from the fact that in the introduction, the author makes it
clear that he will follow an approach that will focus on process and not so much on
substance.2 Therefore, this is a book about process and how this process leads to international
agreements and to the establishment of institutions that form the corpus of international
environmental law. Professor Bodansky has not only offered a book that explores the process
of environmental law making but has also offered a solid argument in favour of, what he
calls, the ‘cool analysis’ of environmental law.3 The author has engaged in an analysis of the
law making process of environmental law not only because of the absence of such a work in
the literature, but also because he seems to view international environmental law, more than
anything else, as a complex evolutionary process.
The book is divided into 12 chapters. The first two chapters are devoted to a presentation
of the basic content and the history of international law. The following two chapters examine
the main environmental problems and the policies that can resolve them. The next chapter,
probably one of the most important ones, deals with the issue of environmental norms. Here,

*
1.
2.
3.

Post-doctoral Researcher, Amsterdam Center for International Law, University of Amsterdam.
See, e.g., PATRICIA BIRNIE, ALAN BOYLE & CATHERINE REDGWELL, INTERNATIONAL LAW & THE
ENVIRONMENT (3d ed. 2009); ALEXANDRE KISS & DINAH SHELTON, GUIDE TO INTERNATIONAL
ENVIRONMENTAL LAW (2007).
DANIEL BODANSKY, THE ART AND CRAFT OF INTERNATIONAL ENVRIRONMENTAL LAW (2010).
In his Preface, Prof. Bodansky states that his experience has led him to see problems as involving
complex trade-offs and that the aim of the book is to be pragmatic. Id. at xi.
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the author introduces the normative structure of international environmental law and
analyses the proper value of the various types of norms. Chapter 6 offers a comprehensive
presentation of the various actors of the international legal process while the next two
chapters focus on the problems of international cooperation and on the negotiation process. In
the next chapter, which draws heavily from a previously published article of the author, we
are presented with an evaluation of customary environmental law. Chapter 10 gives an
insight on the political, economic and practical explanations on why states implement their
international environmental commitments. Chapter 11 deals with the related issue of
compliance while the last chapter attempts an overall evaluation of the effectiveness of
international environmental law.
Bodansky’s main argument makes its consistent appearance throughout the book —
International environmental law should be seen as an ongoing process that leads to
negotiated proposals towards the solution of specific problems. If the predominant view of law
is that of a system of binding rules, the view Professor Bodansky proposes is that “[a]n
alternative approach to international environmental law is less ambitious but more realistic.
It views international environmental law as a process to encourage and enable, rather then
require, international cooperation.”4 It is important to bear in mind at all times that the
participants in this process are numerous complex entities whose functions cannot be reduced
to stereotypes. To give but one example, Bodansky correctly reminds us, in many occasions,
that states are not unitary entities. They are abstractions whose actions in the international
arena depend on a number of factors, often irrelevant to international environmental law.
These complex entities (States, international organisations, NGOs, businesses) take into
account and try to act according to the policies that suit their goals. These policies can lead, in
turn, to a number of different solutions for each problem.
The author correctly maintains that there is no magic solution to all the problems of
international environmental law. A binding instrument that contains strong commitments
might be suitable for one problem while a soft law declaration that seeks to involve as many
states as possible may be more suitable to a different set of circumstances. In other words, the
width and depth of a convention should vary according to the target that the convention seeks
to achieve. Therefore, there is not an a priori correct way. To be sure, Professor Bodansky
duly notes that the power in the political arena of the respective actors is also a very
important consideration, both in the adoption and in the implementation phase.
When the discussion comes to the issue of implementation, Professor Bodansky is quick to
realize and therefore demonstrate, that things are rather trickier. First of all, consistent with
the view of international law as process, he holds that “[i]mplementation is the process by
which policies get translated into action.”5 The implementation process brings out the same
riddles and problems as the ‘art and craft’ of law making. Again, the author focuses on the
actors that are called to implement a given environmental rule or policy. He points out that
there are problems arising out of the complex nature of these actors. In this connection he
states for example, that the non-unitary nature of governments contributes to the problem of

4.
5.
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rule implementation much for the same reasons it contributes to the problem of rule
adoption.6
The author analyses the issue of compliance based on the questionable premise that
environmental agreements are built on reciprocity.7 He first distinguishes between
enforcement and managerial models of compliance. While noting that the managerial model
of compliance is prevalent in international environmental law, Professor Bodansky then
moves on to analyse the various methods of compliance such as national reporting and
monitoring and inspection. He also provides an assessment of compliance through methods
such as capacity building.
Professor Bodansky, after having analysed the reasons that render some environmental
regimes more effective than others, concludes that international environmental law moves
towards greater compliance.8 He maintains that international environmental law is ‘the art of
possible’9 and that overall, despite the shortcomings and failures of the regime, there have
also been considerable successes.10 In a short passage of his conclusion, Professor Bodansky
outlines his view on the future: “in order to address international environmental problems,
we […]need to develop dynamic regulatory regimes that can respond flexibly to new
knowledge and problems, and that take a pragmatic and forward looking approach to issues
of compliance and effectiveness.”11

II. Process
Looking at law as a process is certainly not a novel idea.12 This idea can be summed up as
follows: law must be seen as the decision making process that aims at the adoption of the

6.
7.

8.
9.
10.
11.
12.

Id. at 210.
While there are certainly a large number of treaties that are premised on reciprocity, the bulk of
international environmental agreements generate, in Sir Gerald Fitzmaurice’s terminology, either
absolute or interdependent obligations. See Mr. G. G. Fitzmaurice, Special Rapporteur, “UN Doc.
A/CN.4/107, Second Report on the Law of Treaties, in YEARBOOK OF THE INTERNATIONAL LAW
COMMISSION 1957 Vol. II, 54 (1957). There are some environmental obligations that can be termed
absolute, in the sense that their violation by one party does not affect their performance by another.
The majority of environmental obligations however, would probably qualify as interdependent. This
essentially means that they are based on what has been called ‘global reciprocity’. See Linos
Alexander Sicilianos, The Classification of Obligations and the Multilateral Dimension of the
Relations of International Responsibility, 13 EUR. J. INT’L. L. 1132-1138, at 1135 (2002).
Id. at 260.
Id. at 271.
Id. at 267.
Id. at 270.
Generally speaking, the idea of international law as process can be identified with the Yale school of
international law led by Myres McDougal and his associates. See MYRES S. MCDOUGAL AND
ASSOCIATES, STUDIES IN WORLD PUBLIC ORDER (Yale University Press 1960); see also Myres
McDougal, Harold Lasswell and Michael Reisman, Theories about International Law: Prologue to a
Configurative Jurisprudence, 8 VA. J. INT’L L. 188 (1968). One of the most powerful arguments in
favour of the process approach has been advanced by Rosalyn Higgins. See e.g., Rosalyn Higgins,
Policy Considerations and the International Judicial Process, 17 INT’L & COMP. L. Q. 58 (1968);
Rosalyn Higgins, International Law and the Avoidance, Containment and Resolution of Disputes
(General Course on Public International Law) 230 RECUEIL DES COURS 19, 19-42 (1991) [hereinafter
Avoidance]; ROSALYN HIGGINS, PROBLEMS AND PROCESS: INTERNATIONAL LAW AND HOW WE USE IT

299

10 SANTA CLARA JOURNAL OF INTERNATIONAL LAW 297 (2013)

optimum solution. Rules, on the other hand, must be seen as the accumulation of past
decisions.13 Excessive reliance on rules leads to a rather static view of the law, whereas the
further one moves away from rules ‘the less important becomes the distinction between lex
lata and lex ferenda’.14 As Myres McDougal has observed: ‘[t]oo often it is assumed that the
technical rules which are said to constitute international law can in one formulation describe
what decision makers have done, predict what they will do, and prescribe what they ought to
do’ while this is simply not true.15
The fact that the book focuses on process renders it necessary for the author to engage
more often in an analysis of policy choices rather than rules. This is so because a procedural
view of international law means that the focus should lie with the policies that lead to the
choices as to what should be included or left out on the normative level. Professor Bodansky
does not seem to fully subscribe to the view of law as a process, but more often than not comes
close to it. For instance he states that ‘legal and non-legal approaches to controlling behavior
from a continuum’.16 The interplay between lex ferenda and lex lata, soft and hard law, the
considerations behind the adoption of legally binding instruments as opposed to more flexible
mechanisms, and the constant and pressing question of the appropriateness of each solution
on grounds of political realism, legal value and practical effectiveness, make their appearance
throughout the book.
More importantly however, the author also provides his assessment of these
considerations and choices. The end result can be best described as a refined exercise in
eclecticism. For example, in his perceptive chapter on norms, Bodansky manages to paint a
clear picture of the various levels of effectiveness of different types of norms in international
environmental law. The conclusion is that “what makes a norm ‘hard’ is not that violations
can be sanctioned” but what actually matters is the state of mind of the actors.17
Nevertheless, Professor Bodansky maintains that the legal nature of a norm is important
because, all other things being equal, states are more likely to comply with a legal rather
than with a non-legal norm.18 At the same time he concludes that international
environmental law does not rely on the traditional model of ‘obligation-breach-state
responsibility-remedy’. International environmental law has developed a unique system
focused on rendering the regime more effective19 and its role is to find “the skillful
compromise that bridges the gap between competing positions[.]”20

13.
14.
15.
16.
17.
18.
19.
20.
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(1995). Anthony D’Amato has adopted a similar approach in his book on custom. See ANTHONY
D’AMATO, THE CONCEPT OF CUSTOM IN INTERNATIONAL LAW (1971). D’Amato’s views on custom
were subsequently heavily criticized by writers such as Thirlway and Akehurst. See HUGH
THIRLWAY, INTERNATIONAL CUSTOMARY LAW AND CODIFICATION, 49-54 (A.W. Sijthoff: Leiden 1972)
and Michael Akehurst, Custom as a Source of International Law 47 BRIT. Y.B. INT’L L. 1 (1974-5).
See Avoidance, supra note 12, at 25.
Id. at 34.
See Myres S. McDougal, International Law, Power and Policy: A Contemporary Conception, 82
RECUEIL DES COURS 137, 144 (1953).
BODANSKY, supra note 2, at 250.
Id. at 101.
Id. at 102.
Id. at 269.
Id. at 271.
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A few remarks on the approach of the author would be useful at this point. First of all, it
is readily conceded that international environmental law is one of the branches of
international law where the procedural element is prominent. Most environmental treaties
provide for a framework for co-operation, which facilitates negotiations and allows for the
elaboration of issues pertinent for the convention at hand. This model is sometimes
accompanied by obligations that themselves are procedural in nature, such as reporting,
exchange of information or the duty to consult and negotiate. The question that emerges is
whether this type of commitment to co-operation is the way forward, or whether international
environmental law has reached a certain level of maturity that allows for the adoption of
more concrete, legally binding obligations.
It is very hard to deny that the conclusions of Professor Bodansky are utterly realistic and
very close to perfectly describing the state of environmental law. The problem with this
approach is that it sometimes can lead to a situation wherein states negotiate and end up
with commitments to re-negotiate while subscribing to a number of intermediate procedural
rules. To a significant extent this is the process followed in the negotiation of the new
commitment period for the Kyoto Protocol. This is not the place to get into a discussion on the
merits of Durban, but it seems that while a positive step towards a legally binding document
has been taken, the outcome will remain a mystery for some years.21 As Martti Koskenniemi
has noted, “[t]he substance of general international environmental law calls for equitable
compromises between the environmental and economic interests involved in the particular
situation. Because of the openness and contextuality of this substance, the law turns to
procedure.”22 It is submitted that without clearly defined rules (that need not be necessarily
static) or binding procedures that lead to, as often as possible, predictable results, in a
number of instances international environmental law will remain just a process wherein
decision making will be taking place without ever reaching a substantive result. In this
connection, customary law, third party dispute settlement and state responsibility might play
a key role. In some instances the breadth of custom can be proved useful, the rules of state
responsibility may result in both preventive and remedial action and the final decision of a
tribunal might provide for a solution to a specific and pressing problem.

III. Custom, Third Party Dispute Settlement and State
Responsibility
The issue of customary law, the issue of state responsibility and the role of third party
dispute settlement are central to Bodansky’s major argument. Custom receives separate
treatment in Chapter 9 while a less extensive account of third party dispute settlement and
state responsibility is made in chapters 9 and 11.

21.
22.

See Daniel Bodansky, Evaluating Durban, OPINIO JURIS (Dec. 12 2011, 6:00 PM),
http://opiniojuris.org. The author concludes that “the Durban Platform does not specify anything
about the content of the new ‘protocol, another legal instrument or legal outcome with legal force.’”
Martti Koskenniemi, Peaceful Settlement of Environmental Disputes, 60 NORDIC J. INT’L L. 73, 84
(1991).
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Customary law has been the subject of a paper by Professor Bodansky23 and the relevant
chapter in the book draws heavily from that work. In the paper, the author had put forward
the view that international lawyers should focus more on the development of detailed treaty
rules than debating the status of the various customary environmental norms.24 Professor
Bodansky bases his view on the premise that, regardless of the process of formation of
custom, the norms of customary international law do not represent regularities in state
behavior.25 The survey of customary law by international lawyers is essentially a survey of
what is termed ‘declaratory law’: in other words, custom accounts for what states say rather
than what they do.26 The role declarative law has to play in exerting a ‘compliance pull’ on the
level of interstate behavior, as opposed to third party dispute settlement, is minor.27
The book offers a slightly more nuanced version of the main argument presented in the
paper. Professor Bodansky begins his assessment by examining how the constitutive
elements of customary law, namely state practice and opinio juris, have been studied in the
literature.28 He concludes that a “pluralist view” of customary law is probably the more
correct outlook, as, under that view, “customary norms operate differently in different
communities of actors, in some cases as a formal source and in others as a social norm.”29 The
author moves on to explain that this is the only way to account for the variety in which the
term customary law is being used.30 At this point a differentiation between the book chapter
and the paper makes its appearance. In the book, Professor Bodansky asks a two-pronged
question as to the value of customary law. First, he asks, “to what degree have social
(customary) norms developed relating to international environmental protection” and
whether one is able to induce these norms by observing what international actors do.31
Professor Bodansky argues that since there is no available systematic survey of state practice
the answer must lean towards agnosticism. On the other hand, the answer to the second
question, on whether the principles of international environmental law reflect regularities of
behavior, is in the negative.32 The example used by the author is that of the prevention of
transboundary pollution. These observations lead to the conclusion that customary principles
‘operate primarily to channel future decision making rather than to govern behavior
directly’.33
There is no denying that Professor Bodansky makes a very strong point in favor of an idea
of customary international law as a reference tool for future decision-making. Before
embarking upon an appraisal of Professor Bodansky’s view on custom, a preliminary

23.
24.
25.
26.
27.
28.
29.
30.
31.
32.
33.
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Daniel Bodansky, Customary (and not so Customary) International Environmental Law, 3 IND. J.
GLOBAL LEGAL STUD. 105, 105-19 (1995-1996). The title of the relevant Chapter of the book bears
the same title.
Id. at 119.
Id. at 110.
Id. at 112-13.
Id. at 118.
BODANSKY, supra note 2, at 194-96.
Id. at 196.
Id.
Id. at 197.
Id. at 198.
Id. at 201.
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observation is in order. It is obvious that in order to provide for an assessment of the
argument put forth by Professor Bodansky on the topic of custom there is the need to have
recourse to sources and materials that the author does not recognize as evidences of state
behavior.34 Nevertheless this methodology exemplifies in practice the different approach
followed in this review.
First of all, there is the issue of excessive reliance on what states say rather than on what
they do.35 This accounts for a rather restrictive definition of state practice, in the sense that
claims or declarations made by states are treated as minor incidents within the realm of their
practice. In this connection, one must observe that it is in fact rather difficult to choose what
to pay attention to: acts or words? Both the USA and the USSR were involved in two different
occasions of transboundary environmental harm, while they maintained that they did not
consider themselves responsible.36 They nevertheless did pay for compensation. What an
international lawyer is to discern from that behavior? In much the same vein, state behavior
concerning treaties is also difficult to evaluate. While states may not become parties to a
treaty, they may nevertheless behave in a manner that is not far removed from the one
prescribed by the treaty in question.37Moreover, there are occasions where declaratory law is
indeed important even in a dispute settlement situation. The International Court of Justice
has relied on declarations of states in order to reach a decision the most notable case being
the Nuclear Tests (New Zealand v. France, Australia v. France)38 and the most recent being
the case concerning the Application of the Interim Accord of 13 September 1995 (Former
Yugoslav Republic of Macedonia v. Greece).39 Therefore it emerges that the way states ‘speak
to each other’40sometimes does make a significant difference.
Professor Bodansky refers, both in the book and in the paper, to the rule that prohibits
transboundary harm, as an example to back his argument that international lawyers may
accord customary status to a particular norm while in reality the norm is more honored in the

34.
35.
36.

37.
38.

39.

40.

Id. at 200.
Id.
For a discussion of the Marshall Islands incident involving the U.S and Japan, see Survey of
Liability Regimes Relevant to the Topic of International Liability for Injurious Consequences Arising
out of Acts Not Prohibited by International Law (International Liability in Case of Loss from
Transboundary Harm Arising out of Hazardous Activities), prepared by the Secretariat of the ILC, at
136-137, U.N. DOC. A/CN.4/543, (2004). For a discussion of the Cosmos incident involving the USSR
and Canada, see Claim Against the Union of Soviet Socialist Republics for Damage Caused by Soviet
Cosmos 954, 18 ILM (1979) 899-931.
See e.g., the US Oil Pollution Act, 33 U.S.C. §§ 2701-61 (2006). Also note the relationship between
the Act and the International Convention on Civil Liability for Oil Pollution Damage, 973 U.N.T.S. 3
(1969).
Nuclear Tests Case (New Zealand v. France) Case, 1974 I.C.J 457; Nuclear Tests Case (Australia v.
France) Case, 1974 I.C.J. 253; Application of the Interim Accord of 13 September 1995 (Former
Yugoslav Republic of Macedonia v. Greece), Judgment of 5 December 2011, available at
http://www.icj-cij.org/docket/files/142/16827.pdf.
In the case between fYROM and Greece the ICJ relied heavily on diplomatic correspondence and on
various statements made before the Greek Parliament and in other fora by Ministers, as well as the
Prime Minister, of the Greek Government to the effect that the objections on behalf of Greece for the
admission of fYROM in NATO did indeed constitute a veto. See Application of the Interim Accord,
supra note 38, ¶¶ 73-82.
BODANSKY, supra note 2, at 201.
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breach than in the observance.41 At a closer look, this rule does not mean that all
transboundary pollution is prohibited, or even that significant pollution is prohibited. The
fact that states pollute on a daily basis does not automatically mean that the rule is breached
on a daily basis too. First, the obligation to prevent transboundary harm is an obligation of
conduct and not of result.42 This essentially means that states are under an obligation to
exercise due diligence in conducting activities that might have significant transboundary
environmental impact.43 Due diligence can in turn be analyzed in a number of more specific
obligations, such as the obligation to conduct impact assessments,44 exchange information or
enter into consultations. If states perform these obligations then, even if harm occurs, there is
no state responsibility. This analysis showcases that while international environmental law
has made a cornerstone of its edifice the obligation to prevent transboundary harm, its nature
is much more nuanced and much more lenient from what appears in the first place. The point
made here is not that these obligations are followed by all states at all times, but that the
breach of this obligation, is not that common a phenomenon so as to render it devoid of any
real meaning.
It is true that international lawyers debate customary law because they subconsciously
refer to a third party settlement situation.45Since third party dispute settlement is not a daily
occurrence in international law; excessive debate, or reliance, on custom is not proportionate
to the reality on the ground. Nevertheless, it seems that there has been a growth of these
situations in international environmental law during the last few years.46 The International
Court of Justice has been confronted with one case that bears directly on environmental law
and has two more on its docket.47 The International Tribunal for the Law of the Sea has also

41.
42.

43.

44.
45.
46.
47.
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Even though the phrase in Hamlet has a literal meaning (i.e that the breach would actually confer
more honor than the observance) it must be observed that, uncannily enough, Shakespeare indeed
employed the verse in order to comment on a customary social norm.
See Jean Combacau, Obligations de résultat et obligations de comportement : quelques questions et
pas de réponse, in MÉLANGES OFFERTS A PAUL REUTER, LE DROIT INTERNATIONAL: UNITÉ ET
DIVERSITÉ, 181 (1981), 181; Pierre-Marie Dupuy, Reviewing the Difficulties of Codification: On Ago’s
Classification of Obligations of Means and Obligations of Result in Relation to State Responsibility,
10 EUR. J. INT’L L. 371 (1999).
Case Concerning Pulp Mills on the River Uruguay, (Argentina v. Uruguay), 2010 I.C.J. 135 (April
20) ¶ 101 available at http://www.icj-cij.org/docket/files/135/15877.pdf. See e.g., Günther Handl,
Territorial Sovereignty and the Problem of Transnational Pollution, 69 AM. J. INT’L L. 50, 59;
PHILIPPE SANDS, PRINCIPLES OF INTERNATIONAL ENVIRONMENTAL LAW 882 (2d ed. 2003); BIRNIE,
BOYLE & REDGWELL, supra note 1, at 147.
The ICJ affirmed that the obligation to conduct an EIA is now part of general international law. See
Pulp Mills, supra note 42, ¶ 204.
BODANSKY, supra note 22, at 117.
See e.g., Duncan French, Environmental Dispute Settlement: The First (Hesitant) Signs of Spring?
19 HAGUE Y.B. OF INT’L L. 3 (2006). See also TIM STEPHENS, INTERNATIONAL COURTS AND
ENVIRONMENTAL PROTECTION (Cambridge University Press, 2009).
Pulp Mills, supra note 42. The cases pending are: Aerial Herbicide Spraying (Ecuador v. Colom.)
2011
I.C.J.
31
(Oct.
21),
available
at
http://www.icjcij.org/docket/files/138/16727.pdf#view=FitH&pagemode=none&search=%22ecuador%20v.%20colom
bia%22 (last visited March 27, 2012); Whaling in the Antarctic (Austl. V. Japan) 2010 I.C.J. 23 (July
20)
available
at
http://www.icjcij.org/docket/files/148/15979.pdf#view=FitH&pagemode=none&search=%22whaling%20in%20the%
20antartic%22.
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dealt with at least three cases the that have significant environmental content.48 One must
also consider arbitral awards49 and decisions of specialized tribunals,50 as well as hybrid third
party dispute settlement procedures such as the one endorsed by the Espoo Convention.51 At
the same time there is increasing reliance on international environmental law by regional
courts.52 The development of a larger body of case law will arguably bring about a further
elaboration on the relevant customary and treaty rules of international environmental law.
While it is evident that this elaboration will be slow, fragmented or uneven, one cannot deny
that it will have the effect of clarifying certain concepts that cause considerable frustration for
the time being.
Closely connected to the issue of third party dispute settlement is the issue of state
responsibility. Bodansky deals with the issue of responsibility in Chapter 11. He concludes
that state responsibility is ill suited for international environmental law for three main
reasons: it is legalistic, it views the world in static terms and it is formalistic.53 It is submitted
that all three reasons are not an accurate assessment of state responsibility. First of all, one
must bear in mind that state responsibility is to be used primarily in a context of dispute
settlement. Dispute settlement is by its nature a legal procedure that requires legal
standards so as to function smoothly. True, factual or logical considerations sometimes take
the upper hand, but this does not mean that there is no need for clear secondary rules that
will be used as tools by the courts and tribunals in their decision making process. Second, it is
not true that state responsibility can only be utilized in order to restore the status quo ante.
In some instances, state responsibility can be employed in a preventive context. In both Pulp
Mills and MOX litigation battles, Argentina and Ireland requested the prescription of

48.

49.
50.

51.

52.

53.

See, e.g., The MOX Plant Case (Ir. v. Kingdom), 2001 ITLOS Case No. 10, ¶ 89 (Dec. 3, 2001),
available at http://www.itlos.org/fileadmin/itlos/documents/cases/case_no_10/2001-5.13.11.01.E.pdf;
see also Case Concerning Land Reclamation by Singapore in and Around the Straits of Johor
(Malay.
v.
Sing.),
XXVII
UNRIAA
133
(Sept.
1,
2005)
available
at
http://untreaty.un.org/cod/riaa/cases/vol_XXVII/133-145.pdf; Responsibilities and Obligations of
States Sponsoring Persons and Entities with Respect to Activities in the Area, Advisory Opinion,
2001
ITLOS
Case
No.
17,
(Feb.
1,
2011),
available
at
http://www.itlos.org/fileadmin/itlos/documents/cases/case_no_17/adv_op_010211.pdf.
See, e.g., Arbitration Regarding the Iron Rhine Railway (Belg. v. Neth.), XVII UNRIAA 31 (May 25,
2005) available at http://untreaty.un.org/cod/riaa/cases/vol_XXVII/35-125.pdf.
See, Appellate Body Report, United States – Import Prohibition of Certain Shrimp and Shrimp
Related Products, WT/DS58/AB/R. (Oct. 12, 1998); Report of the Panel, United States – Restrictions
on Imports of Tuna, GATT Doc. DS/29/R 33, (June 16, 1994). See Jorge Viñuales, Foreign
Investment and the Environment in International Law: An Ambiguous Relationship, 80 BRIT. Y.B.
OF INT’L L. 244 (2009) for an excellent overview of the environmental issues that arise before ICSID
tribunals.
Even though the Inquiry Commission, set up pursuant to article VI of the Espoo Convention (See
Espoo Convention on Environmental Impact Assessment in a Transboundary Context, Feb. 25,
1991, 1989 U.N.T.S. 309) is not a legal body but a technical one, it is a good example of how concrete
legal obligations that have a significant technical element can be resolved within the confines of a
treaty body.
See AJD Tuna Ltd v.Direttur tal-Agrikoltura u s-Sajd, Avukat Generali, 2011 O.J. (C 221) 9
available at
http://curia.europa.eu/juris/document/document.jsf?text=&docid=80446&pageIndex=0&doclang=EN
&mode=doc&dir=&occ=first&part=1&cid=231271.
BODANSKY, supra note 2, at 247.

305

10 SANTA CLARA JOURNAL OF INTERNATIONAL LAW 297 (2013)

provisional measures54 by the ICJ and the ITLOS. The Articles of the International Law
Commission on the Responsibility of States for International Wrongful Acts do not favor
either a remedial or a preventive action. They can be used so as to address both situations
and indeed they have been. Third, state responsibility is indeed, as Professor Bodansky
suggests, formalistic. This is a problem if one accords to state responsibility more value than
it deserves and at the same time denies any significant role to dispute settlement. However it
is submitted that state responsibility is a tool that can be used so as to address specific issues
of breach of an international obligation. State responsibility cannot break an impasse in
negotiations nor can it promote the optimum solution to an environmental problem. It can
nevertheless prove to be a very useful tool in environmental litigation and through its
employment by international courts it can provide for solutions to the particular problems at
hand.
The observations made so far in this section do not mean that the identification and use
custom is without problems or that third party dispute settlement or state responsibility are
panacea. On the contrary, the elaboration of customary law, its acceptance by states and, in
the end, the implementation of the obligations is neither smooth nor homogenous.55 However,
it is undeniable that the progress made during the past few years permits some optimism.
The lack of a binding obligation towards third party dispute settlement permeates every
single issue of international law. In the context of international environmental law, states
have been slow to have recourse to courts. It is only during the last decade that states have
utilized the option of judicial proceedings. Regardless of the parallel development of
implementation procedures in an ever-growing number of environmental treaties, dispute
settlement procedures have never been expressly ruled out. Besides their role as decision
makers over a specific dispute, international courts and tribunals also help clarify and
elaborate legal rules. Finally, the rules on state responsibility are not perfect. There are a
number of problems, usually not with what was included in the articles of the ILC but mainly
with what has been left out or has not received adequate elaboration.56 The fact of the matter
however, is that the articles have been applied by international courts and actually seem to
work. Their shortcomings are not that problematic as far as international environmental law
is concerned. What is more problematic, from an environmental perspective, is the lack of a
solution to the problem of liability, an issue that was also recognized by the ITLOS Seabed
Chamber in its recent advisory opinion.57
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IV. Conclusion
The Art and Craft of International Environmental Law is a book that must be read by
everyone, even remotely, interested in international environmental law. It is a book that
presents with clarity, precision and eloquence all the issues that pertain to the making of
international environmental law, despite its disregard for the more traditional approaches to
some problems of international environmental law. The main strength of this effort is that
the argument of the author is consistently supported throughout the book with eloquence and
lucidity. This is indeed a major achievement in a field of international law that is highly
complicated.
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